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1. Introduction 
Environmental regulation of an uniformly dispersed 
pollutant such as carbon dioxide (CO2) is often highly 
fragmented as regulators employ different instruments 
for different sources and emitters. A prominent example 
for partitioned environmental regulation is the Europe-
an Union (EU)’s climate policy under which the overall 
emissions reduction target is split between sources cov-
ered by the EU Emissions Trading System and sources 
regulated on the member state level.1
Major policy choices under partitioned environmental 
regulation involve choosing the instrument for each par-
tition and determining how the overall environmental 
target is split between the partitions. Making these choic-
es ex-ante, i.e. before ﬁrms’ abatement 
costs and future emissions are known by the regulator, 
means that the ex-post marginal abatement costs will in 
all likelihood not be equalized across all polluting sourc-
es. Given the considerable uncertainties about future 
abatement technologies and output (and hence emis-
sions) germane to practical policymaking, partitioned 
environmental regulation thus inherently faces the prob-
lem of achieving a given environmental target at lowest 
possible costs. 
This paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems 
(ETS) with bounds on the price or the quantity of abate-
ment when environmental regulation is partitioned. We 
ask whether and how the ex-ante and ex-post abatement 
costs of partitioned climate regulation that is based on 
an ETS can be reduced by combining price and quantity 
controls. We have in mind a situation in which the regu-
lator has to decide ex ante on the allocation of a given en-
vironmental target between an ETS and non-ETS parti-
tion and on the introduction of lower and upper bounds 
on the permit price or the quantity of abatement in the 
ETS partition. Although partitioned regulation seems 
to be the rule rather than the exception in the domain 
of real-world environmental policies, the fundamental 
public policy question of combining price and quantity 
controls—going back to the seminal contributions by 
Weitzman (1974) and Roberts & Spence (1976)—has so 
1 The EU Emissions Trading System covers about 45% of total 
EU-wide emissions, mainly from electricity and energy-intensive 
installations. By 2020 and compared to 2005 levels, a 21% reduction 
in emissions has to come from sectors covered by the EU ETS and an 
additional 10% reduction from non-trading sectors covered by the 
“Effort Sharing Decision” under the EU’s “2020 Climate and Energy 
Package”–including transport, buildings, services, small industrial 
installations, and agriculture and waste. Sources not covered under 
the EU ETS are regulated directly by member states, often relying 
on renewable promotion and technology policies and other com-
mand-and-control measures. Taken together, this is expected to deliv-
er a reduction in EU-wide emissions of 14% relative to 2005 (which is 
equivalent to a 20% reduction relative to 1990 levels). 
far abstracted from the important complexity of parti-
tioned regulation. 
The introduction of price or abatement bounds in an ETS 
provides a way to hedge against differences in the margin-
al abatement costs across the partitions of environmental 
regulation when some of the abatement burden is reallo-
cated based on actual (i.e., ex-post) abatement costs. Im-
portantly, this can enhance the cost-effectiveness of par-
titioned environmental regulation by moving the system 
closer to a ﬁrst-best outcome in which all emitters face 
identical marginal abatement costs (MACs). We theoret-
ically characterize ex-ante optimal hybrid ETS policies 
with price or abatement bounds and show that it can be 
optimal to allow expected MACs to differ across sectors. 
We further show that from an ex-ante perspective hybrid 
policies can never increase the costs of partitioned envi-
ronmental regulation. 
We complement our theoretical analysis of hybrid pol-
icies under partitioned environmental regulation with 
an empirical analysis of EU climate policy investigating 
the question to what extent introducing hybrid policies 
in the EU ETS could lower the costs of achieving EU’s 
emissions reduction goals. To this end, we develop a 
numerical stochastic policy optimization model with 
equilibrium constraints for the European carbon market 
that is calibrated based on empirical MAC curves de-
rived from a numerical general equilibrium model. The 
model incorporates two important sources of ﬁrm-level 
uncertainties in the ETS and non-ETS sectors that are 
relevant for the policy design problem of carbon miti-
gation: (1) uncertainty about future “no policy interven-
tion” emissions, reﬂecting uncertain output, demand, or 
macroeconomic shocks, and (2) uncertainty about future 
abatement technologies. 
We ﬁnd that hybrid ETS policies yield substantial sav-
ings in abatement costs relative to a pure quantity-based 
(i.e., the currently existing) EU ETS policy. Under sec-
ond-best conditions, i.e. when the regulator can ex-an-
te choose the allocation of the emissions budget across 
the partitions, an optimal hybrid policy reduces the ex-
pected excess costs–relative to a hypothetical, ﬁrst-best 
state-contingent policy–by up to 56% (or up to billion 
$1.5 per year). A third-best hybrid policy, i.e. assuming 
an exogenously given split of the emissions budget, that 
reﬂects current EU climate policy is found to lower ex-
pected excess costs by up to 89% (or up to billion $12.1 
per year). Overall, we ﬁnd, however, that the ability of 
hybrid policies to reduce expected abatement costs di-
minishes if sectoral baseline emissions exhibit a strong 
positive correlation. Further, we ﬁnd that hybrid policies 
with price bounds are more effective to reduce the abate-
ment costs than hybrid policies with abatement bounds. 
Price bounds are advantageous as they can address both 
2
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types of risks whereas abatement bounds can only hedge 
against emissions uncertainty. 
Our quantitative analysis suggests that hybrid policies 
with price bounds are highly likely to yield size-able ex-
post savings in abatement costs, depending on the cor-
relation structure between sectoral “no intervention” 
emissions. If emissions are negatively (positively) cor-
related, the probability of ex-post costs savings is 0.67 
(0.49). Hybrid polices with abatement bounds achieve 
ex-post cost reductions in 66 percent of cases if baseline 
emissions are negatively correlated, but they yield only 
negligible cost savings when baseline emissions are pos-
itively correlated. The reason for this is that abatement 
bounds fail to exploit information on ﬁrms’ abatement 
technology. 
The present paper contributes to the existing literature 
in several ways. First, the paper is related to the litera-
ture on ex-post eﬃcient permit markets. As Weitzman 
(1974) has shown, internalizing the external effects un-
der uncertainty about the costs of pollution control and 
damages (or beneﬁts) from pollution will in general yield 
second-best outcomes with lower welfare as compared to 
an ex-post eﬃcient, ﬁrst-best solution. The relatively large 
literature on ex-post eﬃcient permit markets has suggest-
ed alternative ways for hybrid regulation strategies that 
combine elements of permit markets and price control 
(Roberts & Spence, 1976; Collinge & Oates, 1982; Unold 
& Requate, 2001; Newell et al., 2005). By proposing to 
use different institutional designs, these hybrid strategies 
all propose in the end to implement a price-quantity re-
lation for emissions, i.e. a supply function of emissions 
permits, that approximates the marginal damage func-
tion. The welfare gains of ex-post eﬃcient hybrid regu-
lation relative to either pure price or quantity controls 
have shown to be substantial (Pizer, 2002).2 None of the 
existing studies, however, does consider the problem of 
combining prices and quantities under partitioned envi-
ronmental regulation. 
Second, a small number of recent papers examines the 
idea of introducing a quantity-based adjustment mecha-
nism to the EU ETS (Fell, 2015; Schopp et al., 2015; Kol-
lenberg & Taschini, 2015; Ellerman et al., 2015; Perino & 
Willner, 2015). The so-called “Market Stability Reserve 
(MSR)”–to be introduced in Phase 4 of the EU ETS–
aims at rectifying the structural problem of allowances 
surplus by creating a mechanism according to which 
annual auction volumes are adjusted in situations where 
the total number of allowances in circulation is outside a 
2 In a model of disaggregated ﬁrm behavior, Krysiak (2008) has 
shown that besides increasing expected social costs, hybrid policies 
can have indirect beneﬁts due to reducing the consequences of imper-
fect competition, enhancing incentives for investment, and generating 
a revenue for the regulating authority. 
certain predeﬁned range (EC, 2014). As long as the MSR 
is conceived as altering the environmental target (see, for 
example, Kollenberg & Taschini, 2015), it can be inter-
preted as a mechanism to achieve ex-post eﬃciency in 
European carbon market.3 This interpretation, howev-
er, importantly depends on the premise that emissions 
reductions to reach the overall EU climate policy goal 
are allocated in a cost-effective manner across sources 
inside and outside the EU ETS (as generally pointed by 
Roberts & Spence, 1976). We contribute to this debate by 
analyzing a hybrid ETS when the environmental target is 
constant and the abatement burden has to be allocated 
across different partitions. Moreover, while the MSR rep-
resents a quantity-based adjustment mechanism, we add 
by comparing the ability of price-and quantity-indexed 
bounds to address different types of risk. 
Third, the “safety valve” literature–being in fact closely 
related to the original proposal made by Roberts & Spen-
ce (1976)–has scrutinized the idea of introducing price 
bounds into a cap-and-trade system of emissions reg-
ulation to limit the costs of meeting the cap (Jacoby & 
Ellerman, 2004; Pizer, 2002). Hourcade & Gershi (2002) 
carried this idea over into the international discussion 
by proposing that compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
might be met by paying a “compliance penalty”. Philib-
ert (2009) shows in a quantitative analysis that price caps 
could signiﬁcantly reduce economic uncertainty stem-
ming primarily from unpredictable economic growth 
and energy prices thus lowering the costs for global cli-
mate change mitigation policy.4 While the “safety valve” 
literature on a general level considers hybrid approach-
es to emissions pricing under an ETS, it does not place 
this issue in the context of partitioned environmental 
regulation. 
Lastly, a number of studies have quantiﬁed the eﬃciency 
costs of partitioned regulation caused by limited sectoral 
coverage of the EU ETS (Böhringer et al., 2006, 2014) 
or due to strategic partitioning (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 
2009; Dijkstra et al., 2011). While this literature has im-
portantly contributed to informing the climate policy 
debate about cost-effective regulatory designs, it has ab-
stracted from uncertainty and has also not investigated 
the issue of combining price and quantity controls. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents our theoretical argument and charac-
terizes ex-ante optimal hybrid policies with price and 
abatement bounds under partitioned environmental reg-
ulation. Section 3 describes our quantitative, empirical 
3 Perino & Willner (2015), in contrast, views the MSR as being 
allowance preserving. 
4 In fact, existing cap-and-trade systems in California, RGGI, and 
Australia already have introduced a price ﬂoor. 
3
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framework that we use to analyze the effects of hybrid 
policies for carbon mitigation in the context of EU cli-
mate policy. Section 4 presents and discusses the ﬁndings 
from our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The theoretical argument 
In this section, we sketch our theoretical argument for 
why hybrid policies which combine price and quantity 
controls in the context of partitioned environmental reg-
ulation may decrease expected abatement costs. The ar-
gument can be summarized as follows: consider an econ-
omy with two polluting ﬁrms where emissions from one 
ﬁrm are regulated under an ETS while emissions by the 
other ﬁrms are regulated separately to achieve an econ-
omy-wide emissions target. If the regulator is uncertain 
about ﬁrms’ abatement costs or future emissions, pure 
quantity-based regulation will fail to equalize MACs 
between ﬁrms in most states of the world, hence under-
mining cost-effectiveness. Adding bounds on the permit 
price or the quantity of abatement in the ETS partition 
provides a hedge against too large differences in ﬁrms’ 
marginal abatement costs, in turn reducing the expected 
abatement costs of partitioned environmental regulation. 
2.1. Basic setup 
Although the reasoning below ﬁts alternative applica-
tions, we let climate change and CO2 abatement pol-
icies guide the modeling. We have in mind a world of 
partitioned environmental regulation with two sets of 
pollution ﬁrms: one set, T , participates in an emissions 
trading system (ETS) while the other set, N , does not.5 
We will abstract from decision making within both sets 
and treat T  and N  as one ﬁrm or sector; in particular, 
we assume that abatement within a sector is distributed 
among ﬁrms in a cost-minimizing6 manner.
2.1.1. Firms’ abatement costs and sources of 
uncertainty 
Firm i’s abatement costs are described by the follow-
ing abatement cost function: C i (a i, g i (ϵ i)), where a i : = e 0i + ϵ i − e i denotes sector i ’s abatement defined 
as the difference between the “no-intervention” baseline 
emissions level, e 0i + ϵ i, and emissions after abatement e i. 
Cost functions are assumed to be increasing in abatement 
( ). The functions g i denote the level of the abatement 
technology. We assume that g i is linear in ϵ i with unitary 
5 The assignment of ﬁrms to each set is ﬁxed and exogenously 
given. Caillaud & Demange (2005) analyze the optimal assignment of 
activities to trading and tax systems. 
6 The terms “ﬁrm” and ”sector” are thus used interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
slope ( = 1).7 Costs are assumed to be decreasing in the 
level of the technology (  < 0). The cost functions are 
assumed to be strictly convex, i.e.,  > 0,  > 0, and 
 > ( )2.
ϵ i is a random variable which captures all the relevant 
uncertainty about ﬁrms’ abatement costs. We distinguish 
between technology and baseline emissions uncertainty. 
First, technology uncertainty arises as the regulator does 
not know the costs associated with reducing emissions 
from either substituting carbon with non-carbon inputs 
in production or from adjusting output (or a combina-
tion of both). Second, the regulator does not know the 
level of “no-intervention” emissions, beyond the certain 
level e 0i, reﬂecting the fact that energy demand, GDP 
growth, and other economic conditions may affect base-
line emissions but cannot be known a priori. From the 
deﬁnition of abatement, it follows that baseline emissions 
react linearly to the signal ϵ i . Technology uncertainty re-
acts through the technology function g i (ϵ i) on the cost 
function. 
ϵ i is distributed over compact supports [b i, b i] with the 
joint probability distribution f  (ϵ T ,ϵ N). We assume that 
(ϵ i) = 0. We do not impose any assumptions on the cor-
relation between sectoral random variables ϵ T and ϵ N . 
2.1.2. Policy design problem, information 
structure, and ﬁrm behavior  
The regulator is faced with the problem of limiting 
economy-wide emissions at the level e  ≥ ∑i e i. The ma-
jor premise underlying our analysis is that regulation of 
emissions is partitioned: emissions from sector T  only 
make up some fraction of total economy-wide emissions 
and are regulated by an ETS; sector N ’s emissions are 
not covered by the ETS.8 The regulator has to split the 
emissions budget across partitions by choosing sectoral 
emissions targets, e i. We deﬁne the allocation factor as 
the amount of emissions allocated to the trading sector 
relative to the economy-wide emissions target: λ  = e T /e . 
A policy that only consists of λ  is referred to as a pure 
quantity-based approach as it solely determines the 
quantity of permits in the ETS and maximum amount 
of emissions in the non-ETS sector. The central theme of 
this paper is to investigate hybrid policies that enlarge the 
instrument space by allowing to introduce, in addition to 
λ , lower and upper bounds on the ETS permit price (P , P) or the amount of abatement in the ETS sector (a , a). 
7 g i(·) is not strictly needed for our derivations but names the sec-
ond arguments of the abatement costs function and is thus introduced 
for notational clarity.
8 We assume that emissions control in sector N  is achieved in a 
cost-effective way. 
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The regulator’s problem is to minimize expected total 
abatement costs 
(1)
by choosing either (1) a pure quantity-based regulation 
(λ), (2) hybrid regulation which combines quantity and 
price controls ({λ , P , P}), or (3) hybrid regulation which 
combines quantity control with bounds on abatement 
({λ , a , a}).9
The regulator ex ante chooses a policy design, i.e. before 
the realizations of the random variables and hence before 
ﬁrms’ abatement cost and baseline emissions are known. 
It is assumed that the regulator is able to commit on this 
ex-ante announced regulatory scheme. The distribution 
and cost functions f  and C 0i as well as baseline emissions 
e0i are assumed to be “common knowledge”. Ex post, i.e. 
after the realizations of the random variables, ﬁrms 
choose their abatement. Given the price for emissions in 
each sector, P i, ﬁrms choose their level of abatement by 
equating price with MAC, i.e. P i = ∂C i(a i, g i)/∂a i ∀ϵ i. 
We assume that the environmental target is exogenous, 
constant, and always has to be fulﬁlled. Thus, if ex-ante 
chosen price or abatement bounds become binding ex 
post, sectoral emissions targets are adjusted to ensure 
that the economy-wide emissions target is met. 
2.2. First-best policies 
In an environment of complete knowledge and perfect 
certainty there is a formal identity between the use of 
prices and quantities as policy instruments. If there is any 
advantage to employing some forms of hybrid price and 
quantity control modes, therefore, it must be due to in-
adequate information or uncertainty. A useful reference 
point is thus to deﬁne the ﬁrst-best optimal policy when 
state-contingent policies are feasible. 
The ﬁrst-best quantity control, λ∗ (ϵ T ,ϵ N), and price con-
trol, P∗ (ϵ T ,ϵ N), are in the form of an entire schedule and 
functions of the random variables ET and EN equal-
izing MACs among sectors in all possible states. Thus, 
λ∗ (ϵ T ,ϵ N) and P∗ (ϵ T ,ϵ N) are implicitly deﬁned by 
(2)
It should be readily apparent that it is infeasible for the 
regulator to transmit an entire schedule of ideal price 
9 As we seek to characterize (optimal) policy designs which achieve 
an exogenously set overall emissions target, we abstract here from 
explicitly including the beneﬁts from averted pollution. 
or quantity controls. A contingency message is a com-
plicated, specialized contract which is expensive to draw 
up and hard to understand. The remainder of this paper 
therefore focuses on policies that cannot explicitly be 
made state-contingent. 
2.3. Pure quantity controls 
In the presence of uncertainty, price and quantity instru-
ments transmit policy control in quite different ways. 
Before turning to hybrid price-quantity policies, we ﬁrst 
provide some basic intuition for a pure quantity-based 
policy in the context of partitioned environmental 
regulation. 
What is the ex-ante optimal allocation of the econo-
my-wide emissions target among sectors if λ  cannot be 
conditioned on ϵ T and ϵ N ? The optimal condition of the 
policy decision problem in (1) by choosing only the allo-
cation factor is given as: 
Thus, under a pure quantity approach the ex-ante opti-
mal allocation factor λ∗ex-ante is chosen such that expected 
MACs among sectors are equalized. Given incomplete 
information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs and baseline 
emissions at the time the regulator chooses λ , in all like-
lihood λ∗ex-ante ≠ λ∗ (ϵ T , ϵ N) which implies that MACs 
among sectors are not equalized ex post. Figure 1 illus-
trates this situation by depicting ex-post sectoral MAC 
functions, λ∗ex-ante, and λ∗  (ϵ T , ϵ N)for a given environ-
mental target. Total abatement costs are minimized if 
the abatement burden is partitioned according to the 
state-contingent policy functions λ∗ or P∗ . It is apparent 
from λ∗ex-ante ≠ λ∗  (ϵ T , ϵ N) that the realized carbon pric-
es in sectors T  and N , denoted, respectively, by P T and 
ex-ante P N differ. The excess abatement costs, i.e., change 
in abatement costs relative to a ﬁrst-best policy with 
state-contingent instruments, are equal to the sum of the 
two gray-shaded areas in Figure 1. 
Excess costs arise because of the uncertainty about ﬁrms’ 
abatement cost. Intuitively, ex-ante policy designs capa-
ble of hedging against “too large” differences in ex-post 
sectoral MACs can reduce expected total abatement 
costs and may even lead to lower ex-post abatement costs 
when compared to pure quantity-based environmental 
regulation. This fundamental insight provides the start-
ing point for investigating hybrid policy designs. 
2.4. Ex-post effects of price and abatement 
bounds 
To derive our results on ex ante optimal policy designs 
when the regulator can choose the allocation factor as 
(3)
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well as bounds on the permit price ({λ , P , P}) or on the 
level of abatement in the T sector ({λ , a , a}), it is help-
ful to ﬁrst develop some intuition for the possible ex-post 
outcomes. Consider ﬁrst the case of price bounds. Given 
realizations of ϵ T and ϵ N , three cases are possible. First, 
if price bounds are not binding, the outcome under a hy-
brid policy is identical to the one under a pure quanti-
ty control. Second, the price ﬂoor binds. Given that the 
economy-wide emissions target is constant and has to 
be fulﬁlled, the emissions target in the T  sector has to 
adjust downward thus shifting an equal amount of emis-
sion allowances to the N  sector. Third, the price ceiling 
binds, in which case the abatement requirement in the 
the T  (N) sector has to decrease (increase). It is thus 
straightforward to see that the ex-post allocation factor is 
a function of the state variables ϵ T and ϵ N . The difference 
to a ﬁrst-best policy is, however, that λ  cannot be fully 
conditioned on ϵ T and ϵ N ; it can rather only be indirectly 
controlled through the ex ante choice of price bounds. 
To see why adding price bounds to a pure quantity-based 
control scheme can lower abatement costs in a sec-
ond-best world, consider again Figure 1. Assume that 
the regulator has chosen λ∗ex-ante and a price ﬂoor P . Un-
der pure quantity control (ignoring P) this would lead 
to the emissions prices P T and P N. If the price in the T 
sector realizes below the price ﬂoor (P T < P), the price 
bound binds with the consequence that abatement in the T  sector needs to increase in order to increase the price. 
The abatement in the N  sector therefore has to decline 
to ensure that the economy-wide emissions target holds, 
which is achieved by adjusting the allocation factor to λ . 
As abatement in the N  sector decreases, the carbon price 
in this sector declines from P N to P N. For the case depict-
ed in Figure 1, the introduction of a price ﬂoor therefore 
moves sectoral carbon prices, and hence, sectoral MACs 
closer to the ﬁrst-best, uniform carbon price P∗  (ϵ T , ϵ N). 
The hybrid policy therefore decreases the costs of sec-
ond-best regulation by the light gray-shaded area. A sim-
ilar argument can be constructed for any price ceiling 
above the ﬁrst-best optimal emissions price. 
If the regulator imposes a bound on the minimum amount 
of abatement, the ex post effect is similar to the one un-
der a minimum permit price bound. To see this, consider 
the case where the regulator have chosen a binding lower 
abatement bound such that a  = e 0T λe . This triggers the 
same ex post adjustment in sectoral emissions budgets 
as with a binding price ﬂoor. Hence the savings in total 
abatement cost are identical. Following the same reason-
ing, in Figure 1 a binding upper bound on abatement is 
similar to the case of a binding price ceiling. 
Proposition 1. Consider an economy with polluting 
ﬁrms i  that are partitioned in two sectors i  ∈{T,  N}. 
Sectoral abatement cost functions are strictly con-
vex in abatement, and environmental policy is con-
cerned with limiting economy-wide emissions at the 
level e . Each partition is regulated separately with 
respective targets e T and e N that are pre-determined 
given the allocation factor λ  = e T /e . Then, intro-
ducing bounds on the permit price or quantity of 
abatement weakly decreases economy-wide abate-
ment costs 
Figure 1: Abatement costs of partitioned environmental regulation under “ﬁrst-best” [λ∗ (∈T ,∈N ), P∗ (∈T ,∈N )], “second-best”
pure quantity-based [λ∗ex-ante] and hybrid [λ] policies
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(a) if the lower (upper) bound on the emissions 
price in one partition is smaller (greater) or equal 
to the optimal permit price P∗ , or 
(b) if the lower (upper) bound on the amount of 
abatement in one partition is smaller (greater) or 
equal to the optimal abatement level e 0T − λ∗ e . 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 bears out a fundamental insight: under 
partitioned environmental regulation and given that the 
environmental target is ﬁxed and always has to be met, 
economy-wide abatement costs cannot increase as long 
as the permit price ﬂoor (ceiling) is set below (above) or 
equal to the ex post optimal environmental tax. Consider 
the example of a price ﬂoor: if the initially chosen alloca-
tion factor λ  was too low, i.e. abatement in the ETS sector 
is sub-optimally high, then the permit price exceeds the 
optimal level but the price ﬂoor will not be binding. To-
tal abatement costs will therefore not be not affected. If, 
however, the allocation factor was initially set too high, 
the ex post re-allocation of sectoral emissions targets 
following the introduction of a binding price ﬂoor will 
decrease total abatement cost. Importantly, Proposition 
1 implies that in a policy environment with partitioned 
regulation, if the regulator has access to an estimate of 
the optimal permit price—or equivalently an optimal 
amount of abatement—in one of the sectors, a hybrid 
policy that introduces bounds on the permit price or 
on the permissible amount of abatement together with 
a mechanism that adjusts sectoral environmental targets 
under an economy-wide constant target decreases econ-
omy-wide abatement costs. 
2.5. Ex-ante optimal policies with price 
bounds 
This section characterizes ex-ante optimal hybrid poli-
cies with price bounds. It is useful to re-write total ex-
pected abatement costs in (1) in a way that differentiates 
between situations in which emissions price bounds are 
binding or non-binding:10
(4)
where we introduced sector-speciﬁc allocation factors λ i 
deﬁned as λ T := λ  and λ N = 1−λ T (with equivalent deﬁni-
tions for λ i and λ i). 
10 Throughout the analysis we assume an interior solution for λ .
The ﬁrst line in (4) refers to the case when price bounds 
are non-binding. The second and third line refer to cases 
in which the price ﬂoor or ceiling is binding, respective-
ly. For any ex-ante chosen λ  and price bounds in sector T , there exist cutoff levels for realizations of sector T ’s 
random variable, ϵ(λ , P) and ϵ(λ , P), at which the price 
ﬂoor and ceiling on the emissions price are binding. If 
either price bound is binding, the allocation factor has to 
adjust ex post to ensure that the economy-wide emissions 
target is achieved. These endogenous allocation factors 
are denoted λ(λ , P) and λ(λ , P), respectively. 
The policy problem in (4) is equivalent to the one in (1) 
if price bounds are non-binding, i.e. the regulators could 
choose a price ﬂoor equal to zero and a suﬃciently large 
price ceiling such that it never becomes binding. In such 
a case the expected total abatement cost function (4) is 
equivalent to the expected abatement cost function un-
der pure quantity control (1). The regulator’s problem of 
choosing the policy {λ , P , P}thus includes the case of a 
pure quantity-based regulation. 
Proposition 2. Expected total abatement costs un-
der a hybrid environmental policy with emissions 
price bounds cannot be larger than those under pure 
quantity-based policy. 
Proof. This follows from comparing the regulator’s 
policy design problems in (4) and (1) and noting 
that it is always possible to choose the price ﬂoor 
and ceiling such they are never binding. Thus, (4) 
is a relaxed problem of (1) and costs can never in-
crease as compared to a pure quantity-based regu-
lation scheme. 
2.5.1. Cutoff levels and endogenous 
allocation factor 
The hybrid policy only differs from a pure quantity 
control, if there exist states of the world in which price 
bounds are binding. We thus need to describe how the 
cutoff levels for the random variable in the ETS sector, 
ϵ(λ , P) and ϵ(λ , P), and the cutoff levels for the alloca-
tion factor, λ(λ , P) and λ(λ , P) depend on policy choice 
variables. If the price ﬂoor is binding, cost-minimizing 
behavior of ﬁrms requires that marginal abatement costs 
equal the permit price at the bound. The lower cutoff lev-
el for ϵ T and λ  are implicitly deﬁned by:11
(5a)
(5b)
11 Upper cutoff levels for ∈  and λ  are deﬁned correspondingly but 
are not shown for reasons of brevity.
REPORT 301 MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE
8
Partially differentiate (5a) and (5b) with respect to policy 
choice variables to obtain:12
(6a)
(6b)
(6c)
Equation (6a) reﬂects that a change in the (binding) 
price bound triggers a reallocation of abatement across 
sectors to hold the overall environmental target e . The 
magnitude of this effect depends, besides e , on the slope 
of the MAC curve with respect to abatement which we 
deﬁne as ωR > 0 or the reallocation effect. As MACs are 
strictly convex in abatement, it follows that ωR > 0. The 
steeper the MAC curve, the more the cutoff level chang-
es, in turn implying a larger shift of emissions targets be-
tween sectors. 
Equation (6b) shows that the reaction of the cutoff lev-
els for ϵ  with respect to the price bounds depend on 
the slope of the MAC curve with respect to ϵ . Terms in 
brackets on the RHS indicate the change in the MAC 
as the threshold level changes due to affecting baseline 
emissions and abatement technology (i.e. through the 
ﬁrst and second arguments of C(·)). We deﬁne the com-
bined effect as the uncertainty effect, denoted by ωU . ωU 
is the larger, the less strongly MAC react to changes in 
E. The sign of ωU is ambiguous. If there is no technol-
ogy uncertainty, ωU = ωR, and hence ωU > 0. With tech-
nology uncertainty, and if > 0, ωU is the smaller 
the stronger emissions or technology uncertainty affect 
the MAC. A large inﬂuence of emissions uncertainty on 
the MAC does not necessarily mean that ωU is small as 
technology uncertainty can negatively impact the MAC 
(i.e.  < 0).
Lastly, equation (6c) shows that changing λ  affects the 
cutoff levels for ϵ  in two ways. First, similar to the case 
12 Changing λ  has no impact on the cutoff level for λ  as every 
change in the ex ante allocation factor is ceteris paribus compensated 
for by an offsetting change due to adjusting sectoral targets ex post. 
Thus, ∂λ /∂λ  = ∂λ /∂λ  = 0 is omitted from the equations below. 
of a price bound, there exists an uncertainty effect. For a 
given change in λ , the impact on the cutoff level is the 
larger, the smaller is the slope of the MAC with respect to 
ϵ . Second, an additional reallocation effect arises because 
changing λ  changes how the economy-wide emissions 
target e is allocated across sectors. 
2.5.2. First-order conditions and interpretation 
Expected total abatement costs are minimized when the 
partial derivatives in (4) with respect to λ , P , and P  are 
zero, or when the following conditions hold:13
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
Equation (7a) implicitly deﬁnes the ex-ante optimal 
fulﬁllment factor. Fundamentally, the optimal choice of λ 
still involves equating expected MACs between the two 
partitions. The difference compared to the case with a 
pure quantity control is, however, that expected margin-
al costs now comprise additional terms that reﬂect the 
marginal costs of changing λ  when using price controls. 
The ﬁrst terms on the LHS and RHS of equation (7a) rep-
resent MAC for sector T and N , respectively, in the case 
that none of the price bounds are binding. The second 
and third terms reﬂect marginal costs from switching 
from an ETS system to a system of price controls.14
Proposition 3. The ex-ante optimal hybrid policy 
with price bounds under partitioned regulation al-
locates the overall environmental target such that 
the expected marginal abatement costs across parti-
tions differ in all likelihood in the range where price 
bounds are not binding. 
13 See Appendix D for the derivations. 
14 As for a given choice of {P , P}, the threshold levels for ∈  are 
known, the marginal costs under price controls are known for sector T  while they are uncertain for sector N . This explains the use of 
expectation operators for the second and third summands on the RHS 
of equation (7a). 
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Proof. Follows from the ﬁrst-order condition (7a) 
and noting that for a non-trivial hybrid policy, i.e. 
one under which there exist realizations for E such 
that ex-ante chosen price bounds are binding, the 
second and third terms on the LHS and RHS of (7a) 
are non-zero. 
These additional terms on the LHS and RHS of equa-
tion (7a) that reﬂect the marginal costs under a pure 
price-based regulation receive a higher weight if ωU /ωR 
( ) is large. Intuitively, if price controls are 
not used, these terms (as well as the conditions in the 
expectation operators) drop out. Equation (7a) is then 
identical to the optimality condition under pure quantity 
control (equation (3)). With price bounds, the larger the 
change in the threshold levels induced by a change in the 
allocation factor, the higher is the weight on the margin-
al cost of introducing the respective bound. The weight 
becomes high if the uncertainty effect is lower than the 
reallocation effect; by deﬁnition this implies that the 
change in the MAC cost due to technology uncertainty 
counteract the change caused by the emission uncertain-
ty. In turn, there has to be a larger change in the thresh-
old level implying a larger shift in the marginal cost of 
adjusting the allocation factor. 
Equations (7b) and (7c) characterize the trade-off in 
choosing the optimal price ﬂoor and ceiling, respectively. 
Changing a price control has two effects. First, reallocat-
ing abatement between sectors changes the MAC under 
the price regime change in both sectors (ﬁrst term). The T  sector’s MAC are given by the respective price control 
and the weighting term ωR evaluates the expected differ-
ence between the price bound and the realized margin-
al cost in the T  sector. Second, a change in a price ﬂoor 
or ceiling causes a change in the threshold level. This is 
evaluated in the second term weighted with the marginal 
change of the threshold level (ωU). 
2.6. Ex-ante optimal policies with abatement 
bounds 
We now turn to the situation in which the regulator im-
poses a lower (a) and upper (a) bound on the amount of 
abatement in the ETS sector. In this case, the objective 
function is similar as in the case with price bounds shown 
in (4).15 Cutoff levels for ϵ T and the allocation factor are 
again functions of policy choice variables with the differ-
ence that these now depend on abatement bounds rather 
than on price bounds, i.e. ϵ(λ , a), ϵ(λ , a), λ(λ , a), and 
15 Equation (B.5) in Appendix D states the regulator’s objective 
function for hybrid policies with abatement bounds. 
λ(λ , a). Under a hybrid policy with abatement bounds, 
the cutoff levels are implicitly deﬁned by:16
(8a)
(8b)
Taking partial derivatives of expressions for the cutoff 
levels for ϵ  with respect to policy choice variables yields: 
∂ϵ /∂λ  = ∂ϵ /∂λ  = e  and ∂ϵ /∂a  = ∂ϵ /∂a  = 1. As base-
line emissions uncertainty linearly affects abatement, a 
change in the allocation factor shifts the cutoff level by 
the same amount (taking into account that the alloca-
tion factor is deﬁned as share of the total emission level). 
Similarly, a change in the abatement bound changes the 
threshold level by the exact same amount. Policy vari-
ables impact the the endogenous allocation factor as fol-
lows: ∂λ /∂λ  = ∂λ /∂λ  = 0 and ∂λ /∂a  = ∂λ /∂a  = −e −1. 
As in the price bound case, a change in the fulﬁllment 
factor does not affect the endogenous fulﬁllment factor 
as every change is balanced by the amount reallocated. 
Changing the abatement bound requires decreasing the 
allocation factor in order to hold the quantity balance. 
Proposition 4. A hybrid policy with abatement 
bounds fails to exploit information on ﬁrms’ abate-
ment technology when setting ex-ante minimum 
and maximum bounds on the permissible level of 
abatement. 
Proof. In contrast to equations (6b)–(6c), equations 
(8a) and (8b) do not contain any information on the 
change of the MAC function. 
While Proposition 4 summarizes a basic insight that is 
not very surprising—namely that policies aimed at tar-
geting quantities rather than prices an ETS sector do not 
incorporate any information about the price and hence 
MACs of ﬁrms when determining abatement bounds—it 
bears out a strong implication and, in fact, foreshadows 
the main drawback of hybrid policies with abatement 
bounds when compared with policies with price bounds. 
Due to their ability to make use of information on ﬁrms’ 
(marginal) abatement costs, hybrid policies with price 
bounds are better suited to cope with technology uncer-
tainty. While a policy with abatement bounds is able to 
address baseline emissions uncertainty, it is not effective 
in dealing with risks that affect ﬁrms’ abatement technol-
ogy. In contrast, a hybrid policy with price bounds can 
hedge against both types of uncertainty. 
16 Analogous deﬁnitions for the upper cutoff levels apply and are 
omitted here for brevity. 
REPORT 301 MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE
10
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the ex-ante optimal hybrid 
policy with abatement bounds can be written as:17
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
The interpretation of FOCs is similar to the case of a pol-
icy with price bounds trading off the expected difference 
in sectoral MACs with the sum of sectoral cost changes 
created by introducing abatement bounds. A key differ-
ence as compared to policies with price bounds is, how-
ever, that as abatement bounds are not capable to infer 
information on the abatement cost functions and, conse-
quently, do not include expected changes in the slopes of 
the MAC curves; all terms transporting information on 
ﬁrms’ abatement technology are missing. 
3. Quantitative framework for
empirical analysis
We complement our theoretical analysis of hybrid poli-
cies under partitioned environmental regulation with an 
empirical analysis of EU climate policy investigating the 
question to what extent introducing hybrid policies in 
the EU ETS could lower the costs of reaching EU’s emis-
sions reductions goals. To this end, we develop and apply 
a stochastic policy optimization model with equilibrium 
constraints for the European carbon market that is cali-
brated to empirically derived MAC curves. 
This section describes how we operationalize the theo-
retical framework presented in the previous section by 
(1) deriving MAC curves from a large-scale general equi-
librium model of the European economy, (2) sampling 
MAC curves and baseline emissions for representative 
ﬁrms the ETS and non-ETS sectors to reﬂect different 
types of uncertainty in an empirically meaningful way, 
and (3) detailing our computational strategy to solve for 
optimal hybrid policies. 
17 Appendix D contains the derivations. 
3.1. Derivation of marginal abatement cost 
functions 
Following established practice in the literature (see, 
for example, Klepper & Peterson, 2006; Böhringer & 
Rosendahl, 2009; Böhringer et al., 2014), we derive MAC 
curves from a multi-sector numerical general equilibri-
um (GE) model of the European economy. The model 
structure and assumptions follow closely the GE model 
used in Böhringer et al. (2016). 
The advantage of deriving MAC curves from a GE model 
is that ﬁrms’ abatement cost functions are based on ﬁrms’ 
equilibrium responses to a carbon price, thus reﬂecting 
both abatement through changing the input mix and the 
level of output while also taking into account endoge-
nously determined price changes on output, factor, and 
intermediate input markets. By incorporating market 
responses on multiple layers, the derived MAC curves 
go beyond a pure technology-based description of ﬁrms’ 
abatement possibilities. The sectoral resolution further 
enables us to adequately represent the sectoral boundar-
ies of the partitioned regulation to separately identify the 
MACs of sectors inside and outside of the EU ETS. 
3.1.1. Overview of general equilibrium model used 
to derive MAC curves 
We brieﬂy highlight the key features of the numerical GE 
model here. Appendix C contains more detail along with 
a full algebraic description of the model’s equilibrium 
conditions. The model incorporates rich detail in ener-
gy use and carbon emissions related to the combustion 
of fossil fuels. The energy goods identiﬁed in the model 
include coal, gas, crude oil, reﬁned oil products, and elec-
tricity. In addition, the model features energy-intensive 
sectors which are potentially most affected by carbon 
regulation, and other sectors (services, transportation, 
manufacturing, agriculture). It aggregates the EU mem-
ber states into one single region. 
In each region, consumption and savings result from the 
decisions of a continuum of identical households max-
imizing utility subject to a budget constraint requiring 
that full consumption equals income. Households in 
each region receive income from two primary factors of 
production, capital and labor, which are supplied inelas-
tically. Both factors of production are treated as perfectly 
mobile between sectors within a region, but not mobile 
between regions. All industries are characterized by con-
stant returns to scale and are traded in perfectly com-
petitive markets. Consumer preferences and production 
technologies are represented by nested constant-elastic-
ity-of-substitution (CES) functions. Bilateral interna-
tional trade by commodity is represented following the 
Armington (1969) approach where like goods produced 
at different locations (i.e., domestically or abroad) are 
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treated as imperfect substitutes. Investment demand and 
the foreign account balance are assumed to be ﬁxed. 
A single government entity in each region approximates 
government activities at all levels. The government col-
lects revenues from income and commodity taxation 
and international trade taxes. Public revenues are used 
to ﬁnance government consumption and (lump-sum) 
transfers to households. Aggregate government con-
sumption combines commodities in ﬁxed proportions. 
The numerical GE model makes use of a comprehensive 
energy-economy dataset that features a consistent rep-
resentation of energy markets in physical units as well 
as detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral 
trade. Social accounting matrices in our hybrid dataset 
are based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Proj-
ect (GTAP) (Narayanan et al., 2012). The GTAP dataset 
provides consistent global accounts of production, con-
sumption, and bilateral trade as well as consistent ac-
counts of physical energy ﬂows and energy prices. 
We use the integrated economy-energy dataset to cali-
brate the value share and level parameters using the stan-
dard approach described in Rutherford (1998). Response 
parameters in the functional forms which describe 
production technologies and consumer preferences are 
determined by exogenous parameters. Table C.2 in Ap-
pendix C lists the substitution elasticities and assumed 
parameter values in the model. Household elasticities 
are adopted from Paltsev et al. (2005b) and Armington 
trade elasticity estimates for the domestic to internation-
al trade-off are taken from GTAP as estimated in Hertel 
et al. (2007). The remaining elasticities are own estimates 
consistent with the relevant literature. 
3.2. Sources of uncertainty and sampling of 
marginal abatement cost curves 
To empirically characterize uncertainty in ﬁrms’ abate-
ment technology and baseline emissions, we adopt the 
following procedure for sampling MAC curves for the 
ETS and non-ETS sector. 
3.2.1. Uncertainty in ﬁrms’ technology 
Firms’ abatement costs depend on their production tech-
nology. For each sector (or representative ﬁrm in a sec-
tor), production functions are calibrated based on histor-
ically observed quantities of output and inputs (capital, 
labor, intermediates including carbon-intensive inputs). 
To globally characterize CES technologies, information 
on elasticity of substitution (EOS) parameters are need-
ed to specify second-and higher order properties of the 
technology. Given a calibration point, EOS parameters 
determine MAC curves. Unfortunately, there do not ex-
ist useful estimates for EOS parameters in the literature 
that would characterize uncertainties involved. We as-
sume that EOS parameters for each sector are uniformly 
and independently distributed with a lower and upper 
support of, respectively, 0 and 1.5 times the central case 
value which we take from the literature (Narayanan et 
al., 2012). We then create a distribution of 10’000 MAC 
curves by using least squares to ﬁt a cubic function to the 
price-quantity pairs sampled from 10’000 runs of the nu-
merical GE model. Each run is based on a random draw 
of all EOS parameters from their respective distribution. 
For each draw, we impose a series of carbon taxes from 
zero to 150 $/tCO2.18
Following the design of the EU ETS, we consider electric-
ity, reﬁned oils, and energy intensive industries to be part 
of the trading system. All remaining sectors, including 
ﬁnal household consumption, are subsumed under the 
non-trading sector. We carry out this procedure for each 
partition independently thereby assuming that technolo-
gy shocks across sectors are uncorrelated. 
3.2.2. Baseline emissions uncertainty 
The distribution of baseline emissions for each sector 
is derived by applying the shock terms for the ETS and 
non-ETS sector on the respective “certain” baseline emis-
sions (e 0i) as given by the numerical GE model. For our 
quantitative application, we have in mind the European 
economy around the year 2030. Assuming that baseline 
emissions grow with a maximum rate of ≈1% per year 
between 2015 and 2030, this would suggest about 15% 
higher emissions relative to e 0i .19
At the same time we want to allow for the possibility of 
reduced baseline emissions while discarding unrealisti-
cally large reductions. Therefore, we assume that shocks 
in both sectors follow a joint truncated normal distri-
bution with mean zero and a standard deviation of 5%. 
Lower and upper bounds for the truncation are set equal 
to ±15% of the baseline emissions. Shocks on sectoral 
baseline emissions are meant to capture both common 
GDP shocks, that equally affect both sectors, as well as 
sector-speciﬁc shocks. We thus consider alternative as-
sumptions about the correlation between sectoral base-
line emissions shocks; we consider three cases in which 
the correlation coeﬃcient is ρ  = 0, ρ  = −0.5, and ρ  = +0.5, 
respectively. Truncated normal distributions are sampled 
using 100’000 draws using rejection sampling (Robert & 
Casella, 2004). 
18 We assume that the carbon revenue, net of what has to be retained 
to hold government spending constant in real terms, is recycled to 
households in a lump-sum fashion. 
19 Absent any changes in energy eﬃciency and structural change, 
this would correspond to an annual average growth rate of European 
GDP of the same magnitude. 
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3.2.3. Combining uncertainties and scenario 
reduction 
The two types of uncertainty are assumed to be indepen-
dent, i.e. we assume that technology uncertainty is not af-
fected by the baseline emissions uncertainty. We can thus 
combine the two types of uncertainty by simply adding 
each technology shock to any baseline emissions shock 
and vice versa. The size of the combined sample compris-
es 1e 5 × 1e 4 = 1e 9 observations. 
To reduce computational complexity, we employ scenar-
io reduction techniques to approximate the distributions. 
Distributions for technology and baseline emissions un-
certainty are approximated each using 100 points which 
reduces the total number of scenarios to 10’000. Approx-
imation is done using k-means clustering (Hartigan & 
Wong, 1979) under a Euclidean distance measure and 
calculating centroids as means of the respective cluster. 
For the technology distributions, we cluster on the linear 
coeﬃcient of the MAC curve and derive the mean of the 
higher order coeﬃcients of the cubic MAC function af-
terwards. The original and reduced distributions, along 
with histograms and kernel density estimates of the re-
spective marginal distributions, are shown in Figures D.7 
and D.8 in Appendix D. 
3.3. Computational Strategy 
States of the world (SOW), indexed by s , are represented 
by MAC curves for the ETS and non-ETS sectors, C i s, 
reﬂecting uncertainty both in ﬁrms’ abatement technolo-
gy and baseline emissions. Let π s denote the probability 
for the occurrence of state s . Under all policies, the regu-
lator minimizes expected total abatement costs (10)
subject to an economy-wide emissions target e . ẽ 0is ≥ 0 
and e i s ≥ 0 denote the level of emissions under “no inter-
vention” and with policy, respectively. 
3.3.1. Policies with pure quantity control 
The computation of ﬁrst-best and second-best policies 
with pure quantity control is straightforward as it in-
volves solving standard non-linear optimization prob-
lems. Under a ﬁrst-best policy, the regulator can condi-
tion instruments on SOWs thereby effectively choosing 
ẽ i s. We can compute ﬁrst-best policies by minimizing 
(10) subject to the following constraints 
(11)
which ensure that the environmental target e  is always 
met. P s is the dual variable on this constraint and can be 
interpreted as the (uniform) optimal ﬁrst-best emissions 
permit price. 
Under the second-best policy with pure quantity control, 
the regulator decides ex ante on the split of the econo-
my-wide target between sectors, i.e. they choose sectoral 
targets e i ≥ 0 independent from s . 
We compute second-best policies with pure quantity con-
trol by minimizing (10) subject to following constraints: (12a)
(12b)
(12a) ensures that the economy-wide target is met; the 
associated dual variable P  is the expected permit price. 
(12b) ensures that emissions in each SOW are equal to 
the respective ex-ante chosen sectoral target. The asso-
ciated dual variables are the ex-post carbon prices for 
each sector. 
3.3.2. Hybrid policies with price and abate-
ment bounds 
The problem of computing ex-ante optimal hybrid pol-
icies with bounds on either price or abatement falls 
outside the class of standard non-linear programming. 
The issue is that a priori it is unknown in what SOW the 
bounds will be binding. Cutoff levels, which deﬁne SOW 
in which bounds are binding, are endogenous functions 
of the policy choice variables. Hence, the integral bounds 
in the regulator’s objective function (4) are endogenous 
and cannot be known beforehand. We thus need to spec-
ify an endogenous “rationing” mechanism that re-allo-
cates emissions targets between sectors whenever one of 
the bounds becomes binding. 
To this end, we use a complementarity-based formula-
tion which explicitly represents “rationing” variables for 
lower and upper bounds denoted µ s and µ s , respectively. 
They appear in the following constraints s which ensure 
that ex-post emissions in each sector are aligned with the 
ex-ante emissions allocation: 
(13)
where 1T(i) is an indicator variable which is equal to one 
if i  = T  and −1 otherwise.20 
Condition (13) is similar to (12b) in the pure quantity con-
trol case. The formulation as complementarity constraints 
is necessary here as it enables explicitly representing con-
straint on dual variables (Pis). This allows us to formulate 
20 We use the perpendicular sign ⊥� to denote complementarity, i.e., 
given a function F : n ⟶ � n, ﬁnd z  ∈� n such that F(z) ≥ �0, z  ≥ �0, 
and z T F(z) = 0, or, in short-hand notation, F(z) ≥ �0 ⊥�z  ≥ �0. 
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policies in terms of dual variables which is needed to a rep-
resentation of the hybrid policies investigated here. 
For the case of policies with price bounds, “rationing” 
variables µ s and µ s  are determined by the following 
constraints: 
(14a)
(14b)
As long as the price is strictly larger than the price ﬂoor, 
µ s = 0. If the price ﬂoor becomes binding, complemen-
tarity requires that µ s > 0. In this case, the emissions 
budget in the T  (N) sector decreases (increases), in turn 
increasing the price in the T  sector. 
For the case of abatement bounds, µ s and µ s are deter-
mined by the following constraints: 
(15a)
(15b)
The problem of optimal policy design can now be for-
mulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC) minimizing expected abatement 
cost (10) subject to the emission constraints (12a), (13), 
and (14a) and (14b) for the case of price bounds or (15a) 
and (15b) for the case of abatement bounds. As MPECs 
are generally diﬃcult to solve due to the lack of robust 
solvers (Luo et al., 1996), we reformulate the MPEC 
problem as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) 
(Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995) for which standard 
solvers exists.21 The MCP problem comprises comple-
mentarity conditions (13), (14a) and (14b) (for the case 
of price bounds), (15a) and (15b) (for the case of abate-
ment bounds), and an additional condition, 
(16)
which determines ﬁrms’ cost-minimizing level of abate-
ment in equilibrium. To ﬁnd policies that minimize (10), 
we perform a grid search over policy choice variables e i 
and (P , P) or (a , a), and compare total costs.22
21 We use the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software 
and the PATH solver (Dirkse & Ferris, 1995) to solve the MCP 
problem. We use the CONOPT solve (Drud, 1985) to solve the NLP 
problems when computing ﬁrst-best and second-best pure quantity 
control policies. 
22 We have used different starting values, ranges, and resolutions 
for the grid search to check for local optima. We ﬁnd that total costs 
exhibit an U-shaped behavior over the policy instrument space which 
indicates the existence of a global cost minimum. 
4. Simulation results
4.1. Policy context and assumptions 
underlying the simulation dynamics 
Our quantitative analysis seeks to approximate current 
EU Climate Policy. Under the “2030 Climate & Energy 
Framework” proposed by the European Commission 
(EC, 2013), it is envisaged that total EU GHG emissions 
are cut by at least 40% in 2030 (relative to 1990 levels). As 
there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the pre-
cise commitment, and given that we do not model non-
CO2 GHG emissions, we assume for our analysis a 30% 
emissions reduction target which is formulated relative 
to the expected value of baseline emissions.23
The “Effort Sharing Decision” under the “‘2030 Climate 
& Energy Package” (EC, 2008) deﬁnes reduction targets 
for the non-ETS sectors. We use this information to-
gether with historical emissions data from the European 
Environment Agency to calculate an allocation factor of 
λˆ = .41 which determines the sectoral emissions targets 
under current EU climate policy. 
4.2. Ex-ante assessment of alternative hybrid 
policy designs 
We start by examining the ex-ante effects of hybrid poli-
cies with price and abatement bounds under partitioned 
environmental regulation relative to pure quantity-based 
regulation. We analyze hybrid policies in the context of 
ﬁrst-, second-, and third-best regulation. A ﬁrst-best pol-
icy enables choosing a state-contingent allocation factor 
whereas under a second-best policies an allocation factor 
has to be chosen ex-ante; in a third-best policy the al-
location factor is exogenously given and cannot be set. 
We ﬁrst focus on the impacts in terms of expected costs 
which represent the regulator’s objective. We then pro-
vide insights into how alternative hybrid policies per-
form under different assumptions about the type and 
structure of uncertainty. Finally, we analyze the potential 
of hybrid policies to lower expected costs in alternative 
third-best settings. 
4.2.1. Impacts on expected costs 
Table 1 presents a comparison of alternative policy de-
signs under ﬁrst-, second-, and third-best policy envi-
ronments in terms of expected abatement costs, policy 
choice variables, and expected carbon prices. 
Under a ﬁrst-best policy which can condition the alloca-
tion factor λ  (or the uniform carbon price) on states of 
the world, the expected total abatement costs of reduc-
ing European economy-wide CO2 emissions by 30% are 
39.3 bill.$ with an expected carbon price of 86$/ton. 61% 
23 Since we assume (∈ i) = 0,  (e0i  + ∈ i ) = e0i 
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of the total expected costs are borne by the ETS sector. 
Uncertainty increases the expected costs of regulation in 
second-or third-best best policy environments relative to 
a ﬁrst-best policy: if an ex-ante optimal λ  can be chosen, 
costs increase by 2.6 bill.$ or by about 7%; a third-best 
policy in which λ  is exogenously given increases costs by 
13.5 bill.$ or by about one third. Importantly, second-and 
third-best policies using a pure quantity-based approach 
based on λ , bring about a signiﬁcantly larger variation in 
sectoral carbon prices as is evidenced by both lower min-
imum and higher maximum ETS permit prices as well as 
larger standard deviations in expected carbon prices in 
the ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
The expected excess costs of environmental regulation 
relative to a ﬁrst-best policy are signiﬁcantly reduced with 
hybrid policies. Under a second-best world, introducing 
ex-ante optimal price bounds in the ETS reduces the ex-
pected excess total abatement costs to 1.1 bill.$ which 
corresponds to a reduction of 56% (= (1.1/2.6 − 1) × 100) 
in expected excess costs relative to a ﬁrst-best policy. In 
the third-best world, the cost reduction is particularly 
large. Here, a ex-ante optimal policy with price bounds 
reduces expected excess costs to 1.4 bill.$ which equals 
a 89% (= (1.4/13.5 − 1) × 100) reduction in expected ex-
cess costs relative to ﬁrst-best regulation. The effects of a 
hybrid policies with abatement bounds on expected costs 
are of similar magnitudes. 
The reason why second-best hybrid policies bring about 
sizeable reductions in expected costs of environmental 
regulation relative to pure quantity-based regulatory ap-
proaches is that they work as a mechanism to prevent too 
large differences in MACs between the ETS and non-ETS 
sectors. This can be seen by noting that the minimum 
and maximum carbon prices in the ETS sector under 
hybrid policies in both second-and third-best cases de-
scribe a more narrow range around the optimal ﬁrst-best 
expected carbon price of 86. In addition, the standard 
deviation of the expected carbon price in the ETS sector 
decreases substantially. 
In the third-best, the effectiveness of hybrid policies rests 
on an additional effect which stems from correcting the 
non-optimal allocation factor. A third-best allocation fac-
tor of λˆ = 0.41 compared to the second-best allocation fac-
tor λ∗ = 0.34 means that there is too little abatement in the 
ETS sector (or, equivalently, an over-allocation of the emis-
sions budget). By establishing a lower bound for the ETS 
price or the level of abatement in the ETS sector, hybrid 
Table 1: Comparison of expected abatement costs, allocation factor and bounds for alternative policy designs under ﬁrst-, second-, 
and third-best policy environmentsa 
First-best policy Second-best policies Third-best policies
λ∗ λ∗ λ∗ , P , P λ∗ , a , a λˆ λˆ, P , P λˆ,  a , a
Expected cost (bill. $/per year)
Total 39.3 41.9 40.5 40.6 52.8 40.8 40.7
ETS 24.2 25.4 24.3 24.7 11.8 24.1 24.3
Non-ETS 15.1 16.6 16.1 15.8 41.0 16.6 16.3 
Ex-ante allocation factor λ
optimal .34 .34 .33 .41 .41 .41 
Carbon permit price ($/ton CO2) in ETS
min 37 21 77* 51 8 86* 54
max 197 278 101* 168 174 124* 165
Abatement (mill. ton CO2) in ETS
min 570 572 583 822** 372 617 839**
max 1’138 1’073 1’058 859** 874 997 853**
Probability that [lower,upper] price or abatement bound in ETS binds
– – [0.43,0.27] [0.35,0.5] – [0.95,0] [0.98,0] 
Expected carbon price ($/ton CO2) and stdev (in parentheses)
ETS 86 (18) 89 (31) 87 (10) 88 (21) 50 (19) 86 (4) 87 (20)
Non-ETS 86 (18) 89 (37) 88 (37) 87 (32) 156 (51) 88 (41) 89 (34)
Notes: λˆ denotes the “third-best” exogenous allocation factor reﬂecting the share of the ETS emissions budgets in total emissions based on 
current EU climate policy (EC, 2008). 
a Results shown assume negative correlation of baseline emissions shocks between sectors (ρ  = −0.5). 
* Indicates ex-ante optimal ﬂoor and ceiling on ETS permit price. 
** Indicates ex-ante optimal lower and upper bounds on abatement in ETS sector. 
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polices effectively shift abatement from the non-ETS to the 
ETS sector. The lower price bound, set at 86$/ton, binds 
with a probability of 0.95; the lower bound on abatement 
binds with a similarly high probability of 0.98. As the mo-
tive to correct the non-optimal emissions split under EU 
climate policy is particularly strong under the third-best 
case, hybrid policies work here effectively as a carbon tax. 
Finally, the expected costs under a third-best with price 
or abatement bounds are relatively close to a second-best 
pure quantity control policy (expected costs are only 
slightly lower under the second-best policy with about 
1 bill.$). This result bears out an important policy impli-
cation: if it is politically infeasible to correct policy deci-
sions which have been taken in the past, manifested here 
through an exogenously given allocation factor, adding 
price or abatement bounds to the existing policy can 
achieve policy outcomes that are close to the optimum 
which could have been achieved under previous policy. 
4.2.2. Impacts under different assumptions about 
uncertainty 
In the absence of any uncertainty, there is no distinction 
between price and quantity controls, and hence no case 
for hybrid policies which combine elements of price and 
quantity control. To further investigate the performance 
of hybrid policies, we thus examine cases in which we 
switch off either type of uncertainty (i.e. baseline emis-
sions or abatement technology uncertainty). In addi-
tion, we analyze how the assumed correlation structure 
between sectoral baseline emissions shocks (ρ) affects 
results. Table 2 summarizes the performance of hybrid 
policies relative to a pure quantity control approach in 
terms of impacts on expected excess abatement costs24 
24 See the note below Table 2 for the deﬁnition of expected ex-
cess costs 
for these alternative assumptions about uncertainty. Ex-
pected excess abatement costs are deﬁned as the differ-
ence in expected costs relative to the ﬁrst-best policy. 
Several insights emerge. 
First, abatement bounds are completely ineffective when 
only technology uncertainty is present, reﬂecting the in-
sight from Proposition 4. As ex-ante abatement bounds 
do not make use of ﬁrm’s marginal abatement costs, and 
hence information on ﬁrms’ technology, they cannot 
bring about reductions in expected excess abatement 
costs under a second-best case. It is important to un-
derstand that this result only holds in the second best in 
which it is possible to choose an ex-ante optimal λ, in turn 
implying that there is no scope for abatement bounds to 
reduce expected costs from correcting λ. Under a third-
best case, abatement bounds do indeed reduce expected 
costs—even if only baseline emission uncertainty is pres-
ent—but this is due to correcting λˆ and not due to address-
ing baseline emissions uncertainty per se. In contrast, a 
hybrid policy with price bounds brings about substantial 
cost reductions under both types of uncertainties under a 
second best case. If only baseline emissions uncertainty is 
present, price bounds, however, yield an reduction in ex-
pected excess costs relative to abatement bounds because 
they loose their comparative advantage due to being able 
to address technology uncertainty. 
Second, under third-best policies, price and abatement 
bounds yield virtually identical outcomes. The reason 
is simply that given a non-optimal third-best allocation 
factor λˆ, both types of bounds primarily work to correct 
λˆ. Table 2 suggests that this brings about larger reduc-
tions in expected excess abatement costs than hedging 
against either type of uncertainty too prevent differences 
in sectoral MACs. 
Table 2: Percentage reduction in expected excess abatement costs of hybrid policies relative to pure quantity-based regulation for 
alternative assumptions about uncertaintya 
Second-best policies Third-best policies
(λ∗ , P , P) (λ∗ , a , a ) ( λˆ , P , P) ( λˆ , a , a )
Correlation in sectoral baseline emissions shocks 
ρ  = −0.5 ρ  = 0.5 ρ  = −0.5 ρ  = 0.5 ρ  = −0.5 ρ  = 0.5 ρ  = −0.5 ρ  = 0.5 
Baseline emissions + technology uncertainty
56.4 10.2 50.3 0.2 89.3 76.1 89.8 75.1 
Only baseline emissions uncertainty
63.4 0.4 63.4 0.4 93.6 78.9 93.6 78.7 
Only abatement technology uncertainty
55.4 55.5 0 0 93.7 93.7 95.2 95.2 
Notes: a Expected excess abatement costs are deﬁned as the difference in expected costs relative to the ﬁrst-best policy. Numbers above 
refer to percentage reductions in expected excess costs of a hybrid policy relative to the respective pure quantity control policy. 
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Third, reductions in expected excess abatement costs are 
the smaller, the larger is the correlation between baseline 
emissions shocks. The more positively sectoral baseline 
emissions shocks are correlated, the more likely are cas-
es in which a higher abatement is needed in both sec-
tors. Given the relative slopes of sampled MAC curves in 
Figure 2, this tends to decrease the difference between 
sectoral MACs. Again, this effect is particularly visible 
under second-best policies whereas for third-best cases 
it is strongly confounded by cost reductions emanating 
from correcting λˆ. 
Differences in the ability of alternative hybrid policies 
to reduce expected abatement costs when both types of 
uncertainty are present can now be understood by com-
bining cases which isolated the impact of different types 
of uncertainties. In summary, hybrid policies with price 
bounds emerge as the ex-ante superior policy design 
when compared to abatement bounds, although both 
approaches yield very similar ex-ante outcomes under a 
third-best policy environment. 
Figure 2: Distribution of sampled MAC curves for technology 
uncertainty 
Note: The MAC curve of the ETS sector runs from left to right; the 
one for the non-ETS from right to left. Dotted lines and dark shaded 
areas refer, respectively, to the mean and the interquartile range. 
Figure 2 shows the resulting distribution of MAC curves for the 
ETS and non-ETS sector. It is apparent that the variation in the MAC 
estimates increases with the level of abatement. The MAC curves of 
the ETS sector tend on average to be less steep implying that ﬁrms’ 
in the ETS sectors bear a larger part of the abatement burden.25
25 This is also driven by including the transport sector and ﬁnal 
household consumption sector into the non-ETS sector. As the Euro-
pean transport sector is subject to high fuel taxes, this causes large and 
costly tax interaction effects (Paltsev et al., 2005a; Abrell, 2010). Fur-
thermore, we exclude non-CO2 greenhouse gases from our analysis, 
in particular methane emissions from agriculture, which offer sizeable 
abatement potential and relatively low cost (Hyman et al., 2002). 
4.2.3. Alternative third-best cases 
To what extent can expected abatement costs be reduced 
if an existing quantity-based control policy, as repre-
sented by a given λˆ, is enhanced by introducing price or 
abatement bounds? The answer obviously depends on the 
nature of the third-best policy, i.e. the initially given λˆ. 
Table 3 displays reductions in expected abatement costs 
under alternative third-best policies. Irrespective of λˆ, 
hybrid policies provide sizeable cost reductions on the 
order of 74% to 91%. Cost reductions in all cases peak at 
the second-best optimal allocation factor (λ  = 0.34). In-
tuitively, the closer λˆ is to its optimal second-best value, 
the weaker is the motive to correct λ . This implies that 
price or abatement bounds can be used to a larger extent 
to address uncertainty, hence creating larger reductions 
in expected abatement costs. 
Figure 3 provides further insight by taking a closer look 
at the ETS carbon price under a hybrid policy with price 
bounds (Panel (a)) and abatement bounds (Panel (b)) for 
different λˆ. The major insight born out by Panel (a) is that 
a policy with price bounds effectively behaves as a pure 
price instrument, i.e. a carbon tax, if the deviation from 
λˆ with respect to the second-best optimal λ  is suﬃciently 
large. If λˆ is very small, the emissions budget (or amount 
of carbon permits) allocated to the ETS sector is small 
and the permit price tends to be high. Too high per-
mit prices would imply too much abatement in the ETS 
sector, hence it is optimal for a hybrid policy with price 
bounds to impose a price ceiling. For λˆ ≤ 0.25, the price 
ceiling is equal to the expected carbon price with a stan-
dard deviation of virtually zero. This means that effec-
tively a tax solution is chosen, i.e. the probability that the 
price ceiling binds converges to 1. 
Similarly, for λˆ ≥ 0.45, the hybrid policy with price 
bounds resembles a pure tax policy now with the price 
ﬂoor determining the level of the tax in virtually 100% 
of the cases. A suﬃciently larger λˆ means an oversupply 
of emissions permits to the ETS sector and hence too 
low prices which are counteracted by an always binding 
price ﬂoor (i.e. the price ﬂoor equals the expected carbon 
price which exhibits a standard deviation of zero). As λˆ 
approaches its second-best optimum, the need to correct 
the allocation factor becomes smaller. To address uncer-
tainty, the lower and upper optimal price bounds in this 
case then allow for a positive range around the expected 
ETS permit price. 
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that a policy with abatement 
bounds leads to a larger dispersion of the expected ETS 
permit price when compared to a policy with price bounds 
(while resulting in the same expected ETS permit prices). 
This result is not surprising given the previous discussion 
about the inability of abatement bounds to incorporate 
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information about ﬁrms’ abatement technology. Despite 
this shortcoming of abatement bounds, Table 3 shows 
that for the range of possible third-best cases, abatement 
bounds bring about relative similar reductions in expect-
ed abatement costs. This result again reﬂects that under 
third-best cases costs reduction are primarily achieved 
by correcting λˆ, and less so by addressing directly un-
certainty. Nevertheless, small differences exist between 
both types of hybrid policies. As abatement bounds tar-
get directly abatement, they provide a more direct way 
to correct λˆ. They therefore perform slightly better than 
a policy with price bounds when the deviation of λˆ from 
its second-best optimum is suﬃciently large. When λˆ 
is closer to its second-best optimum, price bounds are 
slightly better from an ex-ante perspective due to their 
ability to address technology uncertainty. 
4.3. Impacts on ex-post abatement costs 
So far, our empirical analysis has documented that hybrid 
policies with price or abatement bounds have the poten-
tial to reduce expected abatement costs for achieving a 
given environmental target when the regulation is parti-
tioned. While the focus on expected cost is important as 
it arguably reﬂects a key criterion in policy decisions, it 
is at least as important for policymakers to have insights 
into the question how likely it is that hybrid policies can 
reduce ex-post abatement costs. 
Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution of ex-post 
abatement costs (in billion $/year) for a pure quanti-
ty-based regulatory approach under ﬁrst-, second-, and 
third-best policy conditions. Given the uncertainty em-
bedded in our sample of empirical MAC curves, it is ev-
ident that there is a substantial variation in ex-post cost 
outcomes. Ruling out the possibility of state-contingent 
hybrid policies, a hybrid policy can never be better than 
a ﬁrst-best policy. The question, however, is how “close” 
the ex-post abatement cost distribution implied by hybrid 
policies—under both second-and third-best worlds—can 
be relative to ﬁrst-best solution. In particular, can hybrid 
Figure 3: ETS carbon price impacts of third-best optimal hybrid policies as function of third-best allocation factor (λˆ ) 
Note: Cases shown above assume negative correlation between ETS and non-ETS baseline emissions shocks (ρ  = −0.5).
Table 3: Percentage reduction in expected excess abatement costs of third-best optimal hybrid policies relative to pure quantity-based 
regulation for different third-best allocation factors (λˆ) 
Third-best allocation factor (λˆ ) 
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.34a 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.60 
Hybrid policy with price bounds
ρ  = −0.5 88.5 88.5 90.2 91.5 89.6 88.6 88.5 88.5 
ρ  = +0.5 74.1 74.1 81.7 88.8 77.3 74.2 74.0 74.0
Hybrid policy with abatement bounds 
ρ  = −0.5 89.8 89.8 90.1 90.3 89.9 89.8 89.8 89.8
ρ  = +0.5 75.4 75.4 78.6 87.4 75.6 75.0 75.0 75.0
Notes: Numbers for λˆ > 0.6 are identical to the case λˆ = 0.6 and are hence not shown.  
a Denotes the ex-ante optimal allocation factor. 
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policies reduce ex-post abatement costs when compared 
with pure quantity-based environmental regulation? 
Figure 5 summarizes the changes in the distribution 
ex-post excess abatement costs of hybrid polices when 
compared to their corresponding pure quantity-based 
control policy using box-whisker plots. For example, 
the ﬁrst two box-whisker plots indicate the change in 
costs of a second-best hybrid policy with price bounds 
({λ , P , P}) relative to a second-best policy with pure 
quantity control (λ). 
Hybrid policies can bring about reductions in ex-post 
abatement costs, relative to pure quantity control poli-
cies, that are both substantial in size and non-negligible 
in terms of the likelihood for their occurrence. If sectoral 
shocks on baseline emissions are negatively correlated 
(ρ  = −0.5), hybrid policies with price bounds or abate-
ment bounds yields largely similar outcomes with respect 
to abatement costs under a second-best world (compare 
the ﬁrst and third box-whisker plots in Figure 5). In 
67.2% (66.2%) of the cases a hybrid policy with price 
(abatement) bounds reduces ex-post abatement costs rel-
ative to a pure quantity control. The inability of a hybrid 
policy with abatement bounds to incorporate informa-
tion about ﬁrms’ MAC, however, means that the distri-
bution of abatement costs is slightly more dispersed, as 
is reﬂected by a wider inter-quartile range and higher a 
maximum value. 
If baseline emissions across sectors are positively cor-
related (ρ  =+0.5), differences between the two types of 
hybrid policies emerge. While a policy with abatement 
bounds results in a less dispersed cost distribution due 
to its ability to directly control the level of abatement, 
it only brings about costs reductions with 13.9% of the 
cases. In contrast, a policy with price bounds reduces 
costs in 49.1% of the cases, however, it creates a more 
dispersed distribution of cost outcomes with larger prob-
ability mass on sizeable cost increases. The reason why 
a hybrid policy with abatement bounds produces a rela-
tively narrow distribution around zero is simply that it is 
not very effective. 
Under third-best policies, cost reductions with hybrid 
policies are almost guaranteed. The reasons is, as dis-
cussed above, that introducing either type of bounds pro-
vide a way to correct the non-optimal allocation factor. 
For ρ  = −0.5, in 75% of the cases, cost savings of 70% 
and larger are achieved. Even if baseline emissions across 
sectors are positively correlated (ρ  =+0.5), policies with 
price or abatement bounds deliver cost savings in 86.5% 
and 88.2% of the cases, respectively. 
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function for ex-post abatement costs under pure quantity-based regulation 
Notes: Assumes λˆ  = 0.41 based on current EU climate policy). Cases shown assume a negative (ρ  = −0.5) correlation in sectoral baseline 
emissions shocks. The respective distributions for ρ  =+0.5 are similar and hence not shown here. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined hybrid emissions trading sys-
tems (ETS) with bounds on the price or the quantity of 
abatement when ﬁrms’ abatement costs and future emis-
sions are uncertain and when environmental regulation 
is partitioned. We have investigated the question whether 
and how the ex-ante and ex-post abatement costs of par-
titioned climate regulation that is based on an ETS can 
be reduced by combining price and quantity controls. In 
our setup, the regulator has to decide ex ante on the al-
location of a given environmental target between an ETS 
and non-ETS partition and on the introduction of lower 
and upper bounds on the permit price or the quantity 
of abatement in the ETS partition. Despite the fact that 
partitioned regulation seems to be the rule rather than 
the exception in the domain of real-world environmental 
policies, we are the ﬁrst to investigate the fundamental 
public policy question of combining price and quantity 
controls when regulation is partitioned. 
Our analysis has shown that hybrid policies that intro-
duce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement 
provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal 
abatement costs across partitions. Importantly, this can 
enhance the cost-effectiveness of partitioned environ-
mental regulation by moving the system closer to a ﬁrst-
best outcome where all emitters face identical marginal 
abatement costs (MACs). We have theoretically charac-
terized ex-ante optimal hybrid ETS policies with price or 
abatement bounds and shown that it can be optimal to 
allow MACs to differ across sectors. 
We complemented our theoretical analysis of hybrid pol-
icies under partitioned environmental regulation with an 
empirical analysis of EU climate policy investigating the 
question to what extent introducing hybrid policies in 
the EU ETS could lower the costs of achieving EU’s emis-
sions reduction goals. We have developed a stochastic 
policy optimization model with equilibrium constraints 
for the European carbon market that is calibrated based 
on empirical MAC curves derived from a numerical gen-
eral equilibrium model and that incorporates uncertain-
ties about future emissions and abatement technologies. 
We have found that introducing hybrid policies in EU 
ETS reduces expected excess abatement costs of achiev-
ing targeted emissions reductions under EU climate pol-
icy by up to 89 percent, depending on the correlation 
structure between sectoral “no intervention” emissions. 
While hybrid ETS policies never increase the expected 
costs, the implications for ex-post costs are a priori un-
clear. Our quantitative analysis suggests that hybrid pol-
Figure 5: Ex-post excess abatement costs of hybrid polices relative to pure quantity-based environmental regulation 
Notes: Solid and dashed lines refer to cases assuming negative (ρ  = −0.5) and positive (ρ  =+0.5) correlation in sectoral baseline emissions 
shocks, respectively. Boxes show inter-quartile range and median. Whiskers show minimum and maximum outside values. Third-best 
policies assume λˆ  = 0.41 (based on current EU climate policy). 
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icies with price bounds are highly likely to yield sizeable 
ex-post savings in abatement costs. Hybrid polices with 
abatement bounds only deliver non-negligible ex-post 
cost reductions if baseline emissions are negatively cor-
related as they fail to exploit information on ﬁrms’ abate-
ment technology. 
An important premise of our analysis is that the envi-
ronmental target always has to be fulﬁlled and that the 
regulator can implement a mechanism which adjusts the 
sectoral targets based on ex-post abatement costs. Such a 
mechanism may in practice, for example, be implement-
ed sequentially by adjusting the targets in each period 
based on observed, past prices and abatement quantities. 
In fact, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR)–to be intro-
duced in Phase 4 of the EU ETS–will adjust the supply of 
permit in each year based on observed excess supply (de-
mand). While the MSR mechanism could be conceived 
as effectively altering the environmental target, our 
premise is that the number of allowances is preserved 
over time. Our analysis therefore provides an economic 
argument for an allowance-preserving MSR-like mecha-
nism that focuses on increasing the cost-effectiveness of 
partitioned environmental regulation by narrowing the 
difference in MAC between the ETS and the non-ETS 
partition. 
Our paper is a ﬁrst step towards analyzing hybrid ETS 
policies under partitioned environmental regulation. 
Several directions for future research appear fruitful. 
First, in would be interesting to study our question in set-
up that incorporates the marginal beneﬁts from averted 
pollution and allows for endogenous choice of the over-
all environmental target. This would essentially imply 
revisiting the analysis of ex-post eﬃcient permit markets 
in the context of partitioned environmental regulation. 
Second, while we assume that emissions in the non-ETS 
sector are regulated in a cost-minimizing manner, the 
question of instrument choice and design in the non-
ETS partition, and potential interactions with (optimal) 
hybrid ETS policies, could be further investigated. In 
particular, this would also enhance the realism of our 
analysis in light of the existing “patchwork” of regulatory 
climate policy instruments in many European countries. 
Third, extending our analysis to a dynamic setting would 
enable investigating intertemporal aspects such as bank-
ing and borrowing and dynamic cost-effectiveness of 
emissions trading systems. Another line of important fu-
ture research would be to consider optimal hybrid policy 
designs when ﬁrms themselves are subject to uncertainty 
when deciding about, for example, investments in pro-
duction capacity and future abatement technology. 
6. References 
Abrell, J. (2010). Regulating CO2 emissions of transportation 
in europe: a cge-analysis using market-based instruments. 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 
15, 235–239. 
Armington, P. (1969). A theory of demand for products distinguished 
by place of production. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 
16, 159–76. 
Böhringer, C., Carbone, J., & Rutherford, T. (2016). The strategic value 
of carbon tariffs. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
forthcoming. 
Böhringer, C., Dijkstra, B., & Rosendahl, K. E. (2014). Sectoral and 
regional expansion of emissions trading. Resource and Energy 
Economics,. 
Böhringer, C., Hoffmann, T., & Manrique-de Lara-Penate, C. (2006). 
The eﬃciency costs of separating carbon markets under the EU 
emissions trading scheme: A quantitative assessment for germany. 
Energy Economics, 28, 44–61. 
Böhringer, C., & Rosendahl, K. E. (2009). Strategic partitioning of 
emission allowances under the EU emission trading scheme. 
Resource and Energy Economics, 31, 182–197. 
Caillaud, B., & Demange, G. (2005). Joint design of emission tax and 
trading systems. PSE Working Paper, 2005-03. 
Collinge, R. A., & Oates, W. E. (1982). Eﬃciency in pollution control 
in the short and long runs: A system of rental emission permits. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 15, 346–354. 
Dijkstra, B. R., Manderson, E., & Lee, T.-Y. (2011). Extending the 
sectoral coverage of an international emission trading scheme. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 50, 243–266. 
Dirkse, S. P., & Ferris, M. C. (1995). The PATH solver: a non-
monontone stabilization scheme for mixed complementarity 
problems. Optimization Methods and Software, 5, 123–156. 
Drud, A. (1985). CONOPT: A GRG code for large sparse dynamic 
nonlinear optimization problems. Mathematical Programming, 
31, 153–191. 
EC (2008). The 2020 climate and energy package. http://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/package/index en.htm, accessed on Jan 2015. 
EC (2013). Green paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy 
policies. 
EC (2014). Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and 
of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a 
market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission 
trading scheme and amending directive 2003/87/ec. http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/docs/com 2014 20 en.pdf. 
Ellerman, D., Valero, V., & Zaklan, A. (2015). An analysis of allowance 
banking in the EU ETS. EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/29, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute. 
Fell, H. (2015). Comparing policies to confront permit over-
allocation. Discussion Paper RFF DP 15-17, Resources for the 
Future, Washington, DC. 
Hartigan, J. A., & Wong, M. A. (1979). Algorithm as 136: A K-means 
clustering algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
28, 100–108. 
Hertel, T., Hummels, D., Ivanic, M., & Keeney, R. (2007). How 
conﬁdent can we be of CGE-based assessments of free trade 
agreements? Economic Modelling, 24, 611–635. 
Hourcade, J.-C., & Gershi, F. (2002). The economics of a lost deal: 
Kyoto-The Hague-Marrakech. The Energy Journal, 23, 1–26. 
MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE REPORT 301
21
Hyman, R., Reilly, J., Babiker, M., Valpergue De Masin, A., & Jacoby, 
H. (2002). Modeling non-CO2 greenhouse gas abatement. 
Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 8, 175–186. 
Jacoby, H. D., & Ellerman, A. D. (2004). The safety valve and climate 
policy. Energy Policy, 32, 481–491. 
Klepper, G., & Peterson, S. (2006). Marginal abatement cost curves 
in general equilibrium: The inﬂuence of world energy prices. 
Resource and Energy Economics, 28, 1–23. 
Kollenberg, S., & Taschini, L. (2015). The European Union Emissions 
Trading System and the Market Stability Reserve: Optimal 
dynamic supply adjustment. Working paper, London School of 
Economics. 
Krysiak, F. C. (2008). Ex-post eﬃcient permit markets: a detailed 
analysis. Environ Resource Economics, 39, 397–410. 
Luo, Z.-Q., Pang, J.-S., & Ralph, D. (1996). Mathematical programs 
with equilibrium constraints. Cambridge University Press. 
Mathiesen, L. (1985). Computation of economic equilibria by a 
sequence of linear complementarity problems. Mathematical 
Programming Study, 23, 144–162. 
Narayanan, G., Badri, A., & McDougall, R. (Eds.) (2012). Global 
Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 8 Data Base. Center 
for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. 
Newell, R. G., Pizer, W. A., & Zhang, J. (2005). Managing permit 
markets to stabilize prices. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 31, 133–157. 
Paltsev, S., Jacoby, H. D., Reilly, J. M., Viguier, L., & Babiker, M. 
(2005a). Transport and climate policy modeling the transport 
sector: The role of existing fuel taxes in climate policy. Springer. 
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J. M., Jacoby, H., Eckhaus, R., McFarland, J., Saroﬁm, 
M., Asadoorian, M., & Babiker, M. (2005b). The MIT emissions 
prediction and policy analysis (EPPA) model: Version 4. MIT 
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report 
125, Cambridge, MA. 
Perino, G., & Willner, M. (2015). The price and emission effects of 
a market stability reserve in a competitive allowance market. 
WiSO-HH Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 28, August. 
Philibert, C. (2009). Assessing the value of price caps and ﬂoors. 
Climate Policy, 9, 612–633. 
Pizer, W. A. (2002). Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate 
global climate change. Journal of Public Economics, 85, 409–434. 
Robert, C. P., & Casella, G. (2004). Monte Carlo Statistical Methods. 
New York: Springer-Verlag, second edition. 
Roberts, M. J., & Spence, M. (1976). Eﬄuent charges and licenses 
under uncertainty. Journal of Public Economics, 5, 193–208. 
Rutherford, T. F. (1995). Extension of GAMS for complementarity 
problems arising in applied economics. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 19, 1299–1324. 
Rutherford, T. F. (1998). Economic equilibrium modelling with 
GAMS: An introduction to GAMS/MCP and GAMS/MPSGE. 
Washington D.C., GAMS Development Corp. 
Schopp, A., Acworth, W., & Neuhoff, K. (2015). Modelling a market 
stability reserve in carbon markets. Discussion Paper 1483, 
DIW, Berlin. 
Unold, W., & Requate, T. (2001). Pollution control by options trading. 
Economics Letters, 73. 
Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 41(4), 477–491. 
REPORT 301 MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE
22
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 
We proof the case of a price ﬂoor and a minimum bound on abatement (the proof proceeds 
analogously for the case of a price ceiling and an upper bound on abatement). If an instrument 
is non-binding there is no reallocation of the emissions budget and hence cost are identical to 
pure quantity-based regulation. If the price or abatement bound is binding, a change in the 
emissions level in the ETS sector needs to be balanced by an offsetting change in the non-ETS 
sector (de T = −de N ) such that the economy-wide emissions target holds (e  = e T + e N ). In the 
case of a binding price ﬂoor, the FOC for abatement in sector T  ensure equalization of the 
MAC to the price ﬂoor: ∂C T /∂a T = P . A change in the price therefore requires a change in the 
allocation factor by moving along the MAC curve: dλ /(dP) = −(e∂ 2C T /∂a T )−1. Differentiating 
the regulator’s objective (1) for a given state with respect to the carbon price in sector T  and 
substituting terms yields: 
A price ﬂoor below the optimal uniform price implies: P  < P N. As ∂C i / ∂a i > 0 and ∂ 2C i /∂a 2i  > 0, 
it follows that  < 0. Introducing a binding price ﬂoor below the ﬁrst-best optimal uniform 
price therefore decreases total abatement costs. 
In the case of binding minimum abatement bound, the change of the allocation factor is deter-
mined by the minimum abatement constraint: e T − λ  =  a . A change in the minimum abatement 
level requires changing the allocation factor such that the abatement changes according to: dλ /
(da) = −e −1. Differentiating (1) with respect to the minimum abatement amount and substitut-
ing terms yields: ∂C /∂a  = ∂C T /∂a T − ∂C N /∂a N . If the minimum abatement amount is below 
the optimal abatement, strict convexity of abatement cost implies ∂C T /∂a T < ∂C N /∂a N and 
∂C /∂a  < 0. Introducing a binding minimum abatement amount below the ﬁrst-best optimal 
abatement amount therefore decreases total abatement cost. 
Appendix B. Derivation of ﬁrst-order conditions for policy design 
problem 
Hybrid policies with price bounds 
Writing expected values in integral notation, the regulator’s objective function (as shown in 
(4)) becomes 
   (B.1)
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Taking the derivative with respect to the fulﬁllment factor λ  yields (applying Leibniz’s inte-
gral rule): 
   (B.2) 
Deﬁne the cost change in sector i by switching from the ex-ante to the endogenous allocation 
factor under a binding price ﬂoor as Δ i = C i(ai(λ),ϵ i) − Ci(a i(λ(λ , P)),ϵ i). With a similar deﬁni-
tion for Δi , using the partial derivatives of the threshold level deﬁned in (6b)–(6c), and ordering 
terms the ﬁrst order conditions become: 
   (B.3)
As the cost difference terms are evaluated at the margin, i.e., at the point the bounds becomes 
binding, the Δ terms are equal to the marginal cost of the respective sector. The sign for the 
respective sector is given by the direction of the reallocation: In the case of a binding minimum 
price, abatement is allocated from the N  to the T  sector implying an increase (decrease) in T  (N) 
sector’s cost; thus: Δ T =  and Δ N = . Likewise a binding price ceiling implies abatement 
reallocation towards the T  sector: ΔT = −  and Δ N = −  . Substituting yields (7a).
For the price ﬂoor we have: 
   (B.4)
Using the derived partial derivatives and using the expectation operator yields equation (7b). 
The FOC for the price ceiling, (7c), can be derived analogously. 
Hybrid policies with abatement bounds 
The regulator’s objective in the case of a hybrid policy with abatement bounds is given by: 
   (B.5)
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Using the partial derivatives of the threshold and endogenous allocation, the derivative of ex-
pected cost is given as: 
   (B.6)
Setting the partial derivative to zero yields equation (9a). (9b) and (9c) are derived similarly. 
Appendix C. Equilibrium conditions for numerical general 
equilibrium model used to derive MAC curves 
We formulate the model as a system of nonlinear inequalities and characterize the economic 
equilibrium by two classes of conditions: zero proﬁt and market clearance. Zero-proﬁt condi-
tions exhibit complementarity with respect to activity variables (quantities) and market clear-
ance conditions exhibit complementarity with respect to price variables. We use the ⊥  operate to 
indicate complementarity between equilibrium conditions and variables.26 Model variables and 
parameters are deﬁned in Tables C.1, C.3, and C.2. 
Zero-proﬁt conditions for the model are given by: c Cr ≥  PC r  ⊥  Cr ≥  0  ∀r (C.1)
c ir ≥  PY ir  ⊥  Yir ≥  0  ∀ i, r (C.2)
c Gr ≥  PG r  ⊥  Gr ≥  0  ∀r (C.3)
c Ir ≥  PI r  ⊥  Ir ≥  0  ∀r (C.4)
c Air ≥  PA ir  ⊥  Air ≥  0  ∀ i, r (C.5)
c Ti ≥  PT i  ⊥  Ti ≥  0  ∀r (C.6)
where c denotes a cost function. Sets i = 1,..., I and r = 1,..., R denotes sectors and regions, re-
spectively. According to the nesting structures shown in Figure C.6b, the expenditure function 
for consumers is deﬁned as:27 
26 Following Mathiesen (1985) and Rutherford (1995), we formulate the model as a mixed complementarity prob-
lem. A characteristic of many economic models is that they can be cast as a complementary problem, i.e. given a func-
tion F : n −→ n, ﬁnd z  ∈  n such that F(z) ≥ 0, z  ≥ 0, and z T F(z) = 0, or, in short-hand notation, F(z) ≥ 0 ⊥  z ≥ 0. 
The complementarity format embodies weak inequalities and complementary slackness, relevant features for models 
that contain bounds on speciﬁc variables, e.g. activity levels which cannot a priori be assumed to operate at positive 
intensity. 
27 Prices denoted with an upper bar generally refer to baseline prices observed in the benchmark equilibrium. θ 
generally refers to share parameters. 
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where 
and where PAE ir denotes the tax inclusive Armington prices deﬁned as:28 PAE ir := (1 + t i ir) PA ir. 
Unit cost functions for production activities are given as: 
where 
28 We abstract here from cost for carbon which are added to the price and suppress for ease of notation the fact that 
taxes are differentiated by agent. 
Figure C.6: Nested CES structure for production and consumption activities 
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For government and investment consumption, ﬁxed production shares are assumed: 
Trading commodity i  from region r  to region s  requires the usage of transport margin j . Ac-
cordingly, the tax and transport margin inclusive import price for commodity i  produced in 
region r  and shipped to region s  is given as: PM irs := (1 + te ir) PY ir + θ TjirsPT j . te ir is the export 
tax raised in region r  and θ Tjirs is the amount of commodity j  needed to transport the commod-
ity. The unit cost function for the Armington commodity is: 
where 
International transport services are assumed to be produced with transport services from each 
region according to a Cobb-Douglas function: 
Denoting consumers’ initial endowments of labor and capital as L r and K r, respectively, and 
using Shephard’s lemma, market clearing equations become: 
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Private income is given as factor income net of both investment expenditure and a direct tax 
payment to the government: 
   (C.15)
   (C.16)
In summary, 4R  + 2I  × R  zero-proﬁt conditions as given by (C.1)–(C.6) determine an equal 
number of activity levels, 6R  + 2I  × R  marketing clearing conditions as given by (C.8)–(C.14) 
determine an equal number of market prices, and 2R  conditions as given by (C.15)–(C.16) 
deﬁne an equal number of income levels. The square system of model equations then endoge-
nously determines all the above unknowns as functions of benchmark parameters (characteriz-
ing the equilibrium before the imposition of a carbon tax) and behavioral parameters (elastici-
ties of production and consumption). 
Table C.1: Sets, prices, and quantity variables 
Symbol Description
Sets i  ∈  I Commoditiesr  ∈  R Regionsccon ⊂  I Non-energy consumption commoditiescene ⊂  I Energy consumption commoditiesmat ⊂  I Material input commoditiesele  ⊂  I Electricity input commodities
Prices and quantities PA ir Armington price of commodity i  in region rPL r Wage rate in region rPC r Consumer price index in region rPG r Public consumption price index in region rPI r Investment consumption price index in region rG r Public consumption index in region rC r  Private consumption index in region rA ir Armington index of commodity i  in region rINC Cr Private income in region rINC Gr Public income in region rI r  Investment consumption index in region rPAE ir Tax and carbon cost inclusive Armington price of commodity i  in region r 
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Symbol DescriptionY ir Production index sector i  in region rT i Production index international transport service iPT i Price index international transport service iPK r Capital rental rate in region rPY ir Domestic commodity i  output price in region rPM irs Price of commodity i  import produced in region r  and shipped to region sPAE ir Tax and carbon cost inclusive Armington price of commodity i  in region r 
 
Table C.2: Parameter values for substitution elasticities in production and consumption 
Parameter Description Value 
Production
σ YTOP Materials vs. energy/value-added bundle 0.20
σ YMAT Materials 0.30
σ KLE Value-added vs. energy bundle 0.25
σ KL Capital vs. labor 0.30-1.50
σ ENE Primary energy vs. electricity 0.30
σ FOF Fossil fuels 0.80
Consumption
σ top Energy vs. non-energy consumption 0.25
σ ene Energy commodities 0.40
σ oth Non-energy commodities 0.50
Table C.3: Model parameters 
Symbol Description
Elasticity of substitution parameters
σ rctop Top level consumption (energy vs. non-energy consumption)
σ rcene Final consumption energy commodities
σ rccon Final consumption non-energy commodities
σ irtop Top level (material vs. value added/energy inputs ) in sector i
σ irva Value added composite in production sector i
σ irvae Value added vs. energy composite in production sector i
σ irene Energy composite in production sector i
σ irfof Fossil fuels in production sector i
σ irdm Domestic vs. imported commodity i
σ irm Imports of commodity i
Other parameters i r Reference investment level htax r Direct tax from household to local government pae ir Armington price inclusive of reference tax and carbon cost pl ir Tax-inclusive reference price for labor in production ipk ir Tax-inclusive reference price for capital in production i pm irs Tax-inclusive import price commodity i  shipped to region s t l ir Labor use tax in production i 
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Symbol Descriptiontk ir Capital use tax in production i t i ir Use tax for commodity i te ir Export tax for commodity i tm ir Import tax for commodity i
θ rCON Expenditure share of energy commodities in total expenditure
θ irCENE Expenditure share of commodities i  in total energy expenditure
θ irCON Expenditure share of commodities i  in total non-energy expenditure
θ jirytop Share of commodity j  in top-level production i
θ irVAE Share of value-added cost in value-added/energy cost bundle
θ irVA Share of labor cost value added cost bundle in production i
θ jirENE Share of commodity j  cost in energy bundle in production i
θ jirFOF Share of commodity j  cost in fossil fuel bundle in production i 
φ Tjirs Amount of commodity j  needed to transport commodity i  from r  to s 
θ Gir Expenditure share commodity i  public consumption 
θ Iir Expenditure share commodity i  investment consumption
Appendix D. Sampling of MAC curves: additional ﬁgures 
Figure D.7: Approximation of distribution for technology uncertainty 
Figure D.8: Approximation of distribution for baseline emissions uncertainty 
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